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Abstract How can an incomplete and uncertain model of the environment be used
to perceive, infer, decide and act efficiently? This is the challenge that both living
and artificial cognitive systems have to face. Symbolic logic is, by its nature, unable
to deal with this question. The subjectivist approach to probability is an extension
to logic that is designed specifically to face this challenge. In this paper, we review
a number of frequently encountered cognitive issues and cast them into a common
Bayesian formalism. The concepts we review are ambiguities, fusion, multimodality,
conflicts, modularity, hierarchies and loops. First, each of these concepts is introduced
briefly using some examples from the neuroscience, psychophysics or robotics literature.
Then, the concept is formalized using a template Bayesian model. The assumptions
and common features of these models, as well as their major differences, are outlined
and discussed.
1 Introduction
It is remarkable that a wide variety of common cognitive issues – in the sense that
they appear frequently – can be tackled by so small a set of common models – in the
sense that these models are shared by these issues. In other words, a few template
mathematical constructs, based only on probabilities and Bayes’ rule, can be applied
to a large assortment of problems that have to be addressed by cognitive systems.
Our purpose, in this paper, is to demonstrate these assertions, by proposing a step-
by-step inspection of these cognitive problems, and, for each of them, by describing
a candidate Bayesian model. The cognitive issues we cover are ambiguities, fusion,
multimodality, conflicts, modularity, hierarchies and loops. Of course, each of these is
a large topic, covering several research domains, from neuroscience and experimental
psychology to modeling and robotics. Each of these regularly warrant full scale reviews
of the relevant literature. We of course do not presume to cover such an extensive
body of work here; instead, we only reference a few key papers as illustrations for each
model. This larger perspective allows, we believe, to better grasp the big picture: it
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2will appear that these issues and associated models are solved by a graduation of very
similar models, each only marginally more complex than the previous.
1.1 Probability as an extension to logic
Both living creatures and artificial cognitive systems have to face the same fundamental
difficulty; that is, how to use an incomplete and uncertain model of their environment
to perceive, infer, decide and act efficiently.
Indeed, any model of a real phenomenon is incomplete. Hidden variables, not taken
into account in the model, influence the phenomenon. The effect of these hidden vari-
ables is that the model and the phenomenon never behave exactly alike. Uncertainty
is the direct and unavoidable consequence of incompleteness. No model can foresee ex-
actly the future observations of a phenomenon, as these observations are biased by the
hidden variables. No model can also provide an exact prediction of the consequences
of its decisions.
Logic is the foundation paradigm for rational reasoning. As such, logic is the core of
mathematics, scientific methodology, computer science and technology, and is possibly
the only common denominator of the various current theories of brain and cognition.
Nevertheless, by its very nature, symbolic logic cannot deal with incomplete and
uncertain information. Symbolic logic can only be used to manipulate knowledge that
is certain to be either true or false. Logical inference is impossible as soon as part of
the required information is missing.
Living organisms must make sensorimotor decisions with quite incomplete knowl-
edge of their environment. However, the creatures that we can observe survive every
day as individuals and have survived millions of years as species. This single fact proves
that adequate (even if not optimal) sensorimotor decisions can be made with incom-
pleteness and uncertainty.
1.2 The subjectivist approach to probability
The subjectivist approach to probability proposes probability theory as an extension to
symbolic logic for rational reasoning in the presence of incompleteness and uncertainty
(Jaynes, 2003). It is sometimes partially improperly called the “Bayesian approach”:
indeed, this now ubiquitous expression sometimes refers to different notions in different
scientific communities.
The subjectivist approach deals with incompleteness and uncertainty using a two-
step process, learning and inference (see Figure 1).
Learning transforms irreducible incompleteness into quantified uncertainty (i.e., prob-
ability distributions). These distributions result from both preliminary knowledge of the
reasoning subject and experimental data obtained by observation of the phenomenon.
Preliminary knowledge, even when it is imperfect and incomplete, is relevant and
provides interesting hints about the observed phenomenon. Preliminary knowledge is
not a fixed and rigid model purporting completeness. Rather, it is a gauge, with free
parameters, waiting to be moulded by experimental data.
Experimental data obtained from physical interaction with the environment reflect
all of the complexity of this interaction. This includes the effect of hidden variables that
3Fig. 1 The subjectivist approach to incompleteness.
are not taken into account by preliminary knowledge. Using the experimental data, the
learning process sets the values of the free parameters of the preliminary knowledge.
Thus, the influence of the hidden variables is taken into account and quantified.
Inference is performed using the probability distributions obtained in the first step of
the procedure.
To do so, we only require the two basic rules of Bayesian inference, the product
rule1 (equation 1) and the marginalization or sum rule (equation 2).
P (X1 X2) = P (X1)P (X2 | X1) = P (X2)P (X1 | X2) (1)
P (X1) =
∑
X2
P (X1 X2) (2)
These two rules are to Bayesian inference what the resolution principle is to logical
reasoning (Robinson, 1979). They are sufficient to perform any inference on discrete
probability distributions. These inferences may be as complex and subtle as those
achieved with logical inference tools. Indeed, it can be shown that logical inference is
a particular case of probabilistic inference (Jaynes, 2003).
Learning itself can be described as a probabilistic inference problem in which the
values of the learned parameters are obtained by maximizing their probability based
on knowing both the preliminary knowledge and the data.
1.3 The Bayesian Programming formalism
The necessary information for completely specifying a probabilistic model consists of:
(1) the relevant variables, (2) the conditional dependencies between these variables,
(3) the parametric forms of the associated probability distributions, and (4) their as-
sociated parameter values.
The usual way of representing such models in the literature uses different graphical
forms (see Bayesian networks described by Pearl (1988) and Jensen (1996), or graphical
models as presented by Frey (1998) and Jordan (1999)). The relevant variables are
nodes, their conditional dependencies represented by vertices between these nodes,
and the parametric forms associated with each node.
1 From which we derive directly Bayes’ theorem, which, strictly speaking, reads
P (X2 | X1) = P (X1 | X2)P (X2)/P (X1), provided P (X1) 6= 0. Most of the time though,
both names and equations can be used interchangeably.
4As probability is an extension to symbolic logic, it is also possible to use an algebraic
formalism to define probabilistic models. We proposed such a formalism called Bayesian
Programming Bessie`re et al. (2003); Lebeltel et al. (2004); Bessie`re et al. (2008).
A Bayesian Program (BP) contains two parts:
– a description that is the probabilistic model of the studied phenomenon or the
programmed behaviour; and
– a question that specifies an inference problem to be solved using this model.
A description contains two parts:
– a specification part that formalizes the modeler’s knowledge ; and
– an identification part where free parameters are learned from experimental data.
Finally, the specification is constructed from three parts:
– a selection of relevant variables to model the phenomenon;
– a decomposition, whereby the joint distribution on the relevant variables is ex-
pressed as a product of simpler distributions exploiting conditional independence
between variables; and
– the parametric forms in which either a given mathematical function or a ques-
tion for another BP is associated with each of the distributions appearing in the
decomposition.
In this paper, we focus mostly on the variables and the decomposition part of
this formalism, in which the joint probability distribution is specified as a product of
simpler distributions. We will omit the parametric forms and the distributions, which
are often problem dependent, in the sense that they are closely related to the problem
at hand (whether the system studied is sensory, motor, etc.).
For instance, if we have a model with three variables, M (the motor commands for
speech), G (the geometry of the articulatory apparatus) and F (the produced sound
characterized by its formants), we can assume a conditional independence between F
and M when G is known. Indeed, knowledge of the shape of the vocal tract provides
sufficient information to compute the formants. The joint distribution, P (M G F ), is
then decomposed as:
P (M G F ) = P (M)P (G | M)P (F | G).
When the decomposition of a joint distribution is available, the answer to any
question you might want to ask of the model may be computed.
For instance, the answer to the question, P (M | F ), which searches for the motor
commands to produce a given sound, is computed as:
P (M | F ) =
P (M F )
P (F )
(3)
=
∑
G
P (M G F )∑
G,F
P (M G F )
(4)
=
∑
G
P (M)P (G | M)P (F | G)∑
G,F
P (M)P (G | M)P (F | G)
(5)
P (M | F ) =
1
Z
∑
G
P (M)P (G | M)P (F | G) (6)
5where equation 3 is obtained by the application of Bayes’ rule, equation 4 is obtained
by the marginalization rule applied to both the numerator and the denominator, equa-
tion 5 is obtained by replacing the joint distribution by its decomposition and finally,
equation 6, as the denominator, is a normalization constant independent of M .
After this short introduction to the formalism, in order to advance our knowledge
about the relevance of the subjectivist probabilistic approach to modeling and build-
ing either living or artificial cognitive systems, we review, in the sequel, a number
of concepts common to cognitive systems, such as ambiguities, fusion, multimodality,
conflicts, modularity, hierarchies and loops.
First, each of these concepts is introduced briefly and illustrated by examples from
the literature in neuroscience, psychophysics or robotics. Finally, we present a tem-
plate Bayesian model to account for these concepts, emphasizing their most prominent
assumptions.
2 Ambiguities
Natural cognitive systems are immersed in rich and widely variable environments. It
would be difficult to assume that such systems apprehend their environments in all
their details, all the time, if only because of limited sensory or memory capacities. As a
consequence, relations between the characteristics of external phenomena and internal
states cannot always be bijections. In other words, internal states will sometimes be
ambiguous with respect to external situations.
2.1 Inverse problem
Description A problem is said to be inverse when we know a direct (or forward) relation
and we seek the reverse relation. The inversion of a deterministic function, which often
does not have a closed-form solution, can be very difficult.
Example Sensation is commonly defined as the effect of some phenomenon on the
senses. Perception involves recovering information about the phenomenon, given the
sensation. Perception is an inverse problem (Poggio, 1984; Yuille and Bu¨lthoff, 1996;
Pizlo, 2001). Indeed, it is often easy to predict the sensations corresponding to a partic-
ular phenomenon (see section 3). In this case, the direct function yields the sensation
given the phenomenon, whereas perception is the inverse problem of extracting the
phenomenon given the sensation. For example, when we know the shape of an object,
basic geometry allows us to derive its projection on the retina. Conversely, it is difficult
to reconstruct the shape of an object given only its projection on the retina.
Model In the Bayesian framework, an inverse problem is addressed using the symmetry
of Bayes’ rule. In a generic example of perception, let Φ be a variable representing some
characteristics of the phenomenon and let S be a variable representing the sensation.
The joint probability distribution is typically factored as:
P (Φ S) = P (Φ)P (S | Φ). (7)
6In this expression, P (Φ) is a prior on the phenomenon; that is, the expectation about
the phenomenon before any observation has occurred. P (S | Φ) is the probability dis-
tribution over sensations, given the phenomenon, which is also known as the likelihood
of the phenomenon (when considered not as a probability distribution but as a function
of Φ); it is the direct model.
The probabilistic question of perception is P (Φ | S), the probability distribution
on the phenomenon, based on a given sensation. This question, which is the posterior
distribution on the phenomenon after some observation, is solved by Bayesian inference:
P (Φ | S) =
P (Φ S)
P (S)
(8)
=
P (Φ S)∑
Φ
P (Φ S)
(9)
P (Φ | S) =
P (Φ)P (S | Φ)∑
Φ
P (Φ)P (S | Φ)
. (10)
Equation 8 is the application of Bayes’ rule, and equation 9 is the application of the
marginalization rule. In equation 10, the joint distribution is replaced by its decompo-
sition (equation 7). This expression can be computed because it only involves the prior
and the likelihood functions, which are specified in the decomposition.
2.2 Ill-posed problem
Description A problem is said to be well posed when it admits a unique solution.
Conversely, an ill-posed problem admits either many solutions or no solution at all.
In most of the non-trivial inverse problems, the direct functions are not injective.
Therefore, the inverse relation is not properly a function. When the direct function is
not injective, the inverse problem is ill-posed.
Example Perception is often an ill-posed problem. One illustrative example is the well-
known Necker cube, in which a wire-frame 2-D drawing of a cube is often perceived
as a cube in one of two possible positions (even if it can actually correspond to the
projection of an infinite number of 3-D structures).
There are many other examples of ill-posed perception, including recovering the
shape of an object from lighting or motion. Such examples have led to the development
of Bayesian models of perception, which are reviewed in the book by Knill and Richards
(1996) and in the article by Kersten et al. (2004). It has also been argued that illusions
arise when ill-posed problems are solved by choosing a solution that does not correspond
to the reality of the percept (an example can be found in Geisler and Kersten (2002)).
In robotics, a common instance of an ill-posed problem is perceptual aliasing, which
occurs in robot localization when two different locations in an environment produce
identical sensor readings (Kuipers, 2000; Thrun, 2000).
In speech recognition or generation, recovering the seven-dimensional shape of the
vocal tract (Maeda, 1990) from the first four dimensions (formants) of the acoustic
signal alone would be another example of an ill-posed problem. More generally, the
control of any redundant motor system (i.e., one with more degrees of freedom than
the dimension of the space to be accessed) is an ill-posed problem.
7Model In the Bayesian framework, the focus is not on finding a solution matching all
the constraints of the problem. Instead, a probability distribution is computed. The
analogy of a well-posed problem is a distribution with exactly one mode. An ill-posed
problem will typically yield a multimodal distribution, or a distribution with a plateau.
The theoretical issue with inverse problems is that a direct function does not always
admit an inverse function. In the Bayesian framework, the probability distribution can
always be reversed, even if it is difficult to compute. Notice that the property of an
ill-posed problem is defined by the result of the inference. On the other hand, a problem
is inverse by virtue of its structure. Therefore, an ill-posed problem is not necessarily
an inverse problem.
2.3 Discussion
An ambiguity is a difficulty in finding a unique interpretation for a given stimulus.
This often leads to multistable percepts, in which case, different interpretations can be
actually perceived in the same conditions. Perceptual reversals can be involved when a
transition occurs from one percept to another. Ambiguity often arises as a consequence
of an ill-posed, inverse problem.
However, an ambiguous likelihood for a given stimulus does not always induce
multiple percepts. Indeed, as equation 10 shows, the likelihood is multiplied by the
prior, which can filter out part of the solutions. An illusion can occur precisely when
the likelihood produces multiple interpretations and the prior rules out the correct one.
3 Fusion, multimodality, conflicts
Natural cognitive systems are equipped with a variety of rich sensors: rich, as they
continuously provide several measurements about a given phenomenon (e.g., multiple
cells in the retina), and various, as they can measure different manifestations of the
same phenomenon (e.g., both hearing and seeing a falling object). The difficulty arises
when several of these measurements are to be used together to recover characteristics
of the phenomenon. We argue that the concepts of fusion, multimodality and conflict
can generally be cast into the same model structure. This model is structured around
the conditional independency assumption. We also present extensions of this model
that alleviate this assumption, thus trading model simplicity for expressiveness.
3.1 Fusion
Description Often, there are multiple sources of information that can be exploited for
any given phenomenon. Fusion is the process of forming a single percept starting from
multiple sources of information.
Example A common example of fusion in the study of perception is cue combination
(or intramodal fusion). For instance, Jacobs (1999) studied the perception of the depth
of a simulated rotated cylinder. The depth of the cylinder can be perceived by the
motion of the texture, the deformation of the texture, or both. Weiss et al. (2002),
who studied the perception of the motion of a rhombus, proposed a model of fusion of
8the velocity estimates obtained from the edges that, in particular, can account for an
illusion in the perception of the motion of a flat rhombus. Hillis et al. (2004) proposed
a model for combining texture and disparity cues for perceiving the slant of a plane.
One last example is given by Drewing and Ernst (2006), who modeled the perception
of curvature from haptic feedback, using both position and force information.
In engineering and robotics, fusion is a common tool that is involved in many
applications (e.g., sensor fusion, medical diagnosis and antispam filters).
Model All these examples follow the classical model of naive Bayesian fusion (some-
times called weak fusion). A variant of this model is the naive Bayes’ classifier (Mitchell,
1997). This model relies on the assumption that each piece of information is indepen-
dent from the others, conditioned on knowledge of the phenomenon. Each piece of
information is related to the phenomenon using an inverse model similar to that dis-
cussed in section 2.1. For instance, once the cause is known, the consequences follow
independently. This very strong hypothesis is far from always being satisfied. However,
it often gives satisfactory results.
With S1, . . . , SN representing the variables corresponding to the N pieces of in-
formation that are to be part of the fusion, and Φ being the variable corresponding
to characteristics of interest in the phenomenon, the naive fusion model assumes the
following decomposition of the joint probability distribution:
P (Φ S1 · · ·SN ) = P (Φ)
N∏
i=1
P (Si | Φ). (11)
This model can be used to compute the probability distribution on the phenomenon,
Φ, given all the sensations, S1, . . . , SN :
P (Φ | S1 · · · SN ) =
P (Φ)
∏N
i=1 P (Si | Φ)
P (S1 · · · SN )
∝ P (Φ)
N∏
i=1
P (Si | Φ).
This model offers the advantage of being much simpler than a complete model
without any independence, as the joint is written as a product of low dimensional fac-
tors. The size of a complete joint probability distribution is exponential in the number
of variables, whereas it is only linear when assuming naive fusion.
Furthermore, the use of many information sources generally allows for an increase
in the signal. For example, in the case of Gaussian uncertainty for the sensor mod-
els, P (Si | Φ), and the prior, P (Φ), the uncertainty of the posterior distribution,
P (Φ | S1 · · ·SN ), can be proven to be smaller with such a model than if the pieces
of information are not fused at all.
Note that some models rely onmaximum likelihood estimation (MLE). That is, they
do not compute the posterior probability distribution, P (Φ | S1 · · ·SN ), but instead
they are concerned with the likelihood of the phenomenon, P (S1 · · ·SN | Φ). For a
given set of sensations, this is a function of Φ that reflects how well the phenomenon
explains the sensations. Thus, the MLE selects the phenomenon that best matches the
data.
Moreover, Bayes’ rule is written as: P (Φ | S1 · · ·SN ) ∝ P (Φ)P (S1 · · ·SN | Φ).With
a uniform prior, this states that the posterior is proportional to the likelihood. There-
fore, the MLE is tantamount to assuming a uniform prior or dismissing it altogether.
93.2 Multimodality
Description Fusion is often considered within a sensory modality, such as vision or
touch. However, it is often beneficial to consider multiple sources of information from
various sensory modalities when forming a percept in what is known as multimodality.
Example Bayesian modeling has often been used to study multimodal fusion. For ex-
ample, Anastasio et al. (2000) have proposed a model of multisensory enhancement in
the superior colliculus. Enhancement occurs when the neural response to a stimulus
in one modality is augmented by a stimulus in another modality. In their work, they
proposed a model of the probability of a target in the colliculus with respect to the
presence or absence of visual and auditory input. Zupan et al. (2002) have proposed
a model for visuo-vestibular interaction in which they use a sensory weighing model,
interpreted as an MLE. Gepshtein and Banks (2003), who studied visuo-haptic inte-
gration, used a maximum likelihood model in which the reliability of the visual cues
is related to the projection. Ko¨rding and Wolpert (2004a) performed experiments on
sensorimotor learning. Using a Bayesian model of integration between visual feedback
and proprioception, they inferred and manipulated the prior distributions assumed for
the participants in their experiments. Ju¨rgens and Becker (2006) used Bayesian fusion
for the combination of vestibular, optokinetic, podokinesthetic, and cognitive informa-
tion for the perception of rotation. Finally, Haith et al. (2008) looks into sensorymotor
adaptation in a visually guided reaching experiment and proposes a model that can also
account for perceptual after-effects. This model predicts a visual shift after adaptation
of reaching in a force field, that has been confirmed by an experiment.
Model These models match the assumptions of the naive Bayesian fusion model pre-
sented above. The main assumption is that the probability distribution over each sen-
sation is independent of the others given the phenomenon. Some of these models use
MLE, while others compute the complete posterior distribution.
Although the models are the same as those for intramodal fusion, they differ in
robustness. The conditional independence hypothesis is never totally valid. Part of the
uncertainty that exists between sensations may not be explained by Φ. These additional
correlations are more likely smaller between different modalities than within the same
modality, as different physical processes are involved. For example, while fog or lack of
illumination can jointly degrade different types of visual information, such as colour or
motion, hearing performance is not affected.
3.3 Conflicts
Description When various sources of information are involved, each can sometimes
lead to significantly different individual percepts. In experiments, a conflict arises when
sensations from different modalities induce different behaviour compared with when
each modality is observed individually.
Introducing conflicts offers good experimental leverage for providing a lot of infor-
mation on the fusion process. For instance, the relative importance of different cues
can be assessed by observing the frequencies of behaviour corresponding to each of the
cues. Sometimes, the response to conflicting situations is mixed behaviour that is also
interesting to study when compared with that occurring in the original situations.
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Examples To study the integration of visual and haptic information, Ernst and Banks
(2002) designed experiments in which the height of a bar had to be evaluated either
by simulated visual input, simulated tactile input or both. In this latter condition,
when different heights for both visual and haptic stimuli were simulated, a maximum-
likelihood model provided a good match to their data. Battaglia et al. (2003) designed
a localization task with conflicting visual and auditory input to compare the classi-
cal visual capture model with a maximum likelihood model. They argued for taking
into account the observers’ perceptual biases. One special case of this conflict is the
ventriloquist effect (Alais and Burr, 2004; Banks, 2004).
Model The models accounting for conflicts are still naive fusion and maximum likeli-
hood (with a naive fusion decomposition). Conflicts arise when the probability distri-
butions corresponding to each sensation are significantly different.
The concept of a conflict is of a similar nature to that of an ill-posed problem.
Both are defined with respect to characteristics of the result. Conversely, inversion and
fusion are both structural properties of a problem and its associated model.
3.4 Less naive fusion
Description Many models assume independence between the sensations conditionally
to knowledge of the phenomenon. This is sometimes too strong an assumption. A model
could assume no conditional independence between the cues. This is sometimes called
strong fusion, and leads to arbitrarily complex models that are not tested easily. Less
naive fusion models lie between strong fusion and naive (or weak) fusion.
Example For instance, Landy et al. (1995) introduced a modified weak fusion frame-
work. They tackled the cue combination problem in depth estimation and argued for
the addition of so-called ancillary cues. These cues do not provide direct information
on depth but help to assess the reliability of the various cues that appear in the fusion
process. Ancillary cues are the basis for a dynamic reweighting of the depth cues.
Yuille and Bu¨lthoff (1996) propose the term strong coupling for non-naive Bayesian
fusion. They consider the examples of shape recovery from shading and texture, and the
coupling of binocular depth cues with monocular cues obtained from motion parallax.
Models Recall that the naive fusion model is based on the following factorization of
the joint probability distribution (equation 11):
P (Φ S1 · · ·SN ) = P (Φ)
N∏
i=1
P (Si | Φ).
The inclusion of ancillary cues can be achieved by the addition of a variable, A, to
represent them.2 Typically, the joint distribution is then factored as:
P (Φ A S1 · · ·SN ) = P (Φ)P (A | Φ)
N∏
i=1
P (Si | Φ A).
2 We note that Landy et al. (1995) did not find this type of Bayesian model to be useful.
11
We can still ask the same question of the phenomenon given the sensations:
P (Φ | S1 · · ·SN ) ∝ P (Φ)
∑
A
[
P (A | Φ)
N∏
i=1
P (Si | Φ A)
]
(12)
or we can know the value of the ancillary cue:
P (Φ | A S1 · · ·SN ) ∝ P (Φ)P (A | Φ)
N∏
i=1
P (Si | Φ A). (13)
This model is the same as a naive fusion model but with a phenomenon augmented
by the ancillary cues, Φ′ = Φ ∧ A. The only difference is in the questions asked, this
new model only being concerned with a part, Φ, of the global phenomenon, Φ′, either
with knowledge of ancillary cues, A, (this question is illustrated by equation 13) or not
(this question is illustrated by equation 12).
3.5 Discussion
Fusion is often seen as a product of models. It can be used when the underlying models
are defined independently so that they can be combined to form a shared variable.
Each model links this variable to distinct properties, and the fusion operates on the
conjunction (logical product) of these properties.
This idea of fusion as a product of independent models is also mirrored by the
inference process. Indeed, most of the time, the result of the fusion process is pro-
portional to the product of each individual result obtained by the underlying models,
P (Φ | S1 · · ·Sn) ∝
∏N
i=1 P (Φ | Si). However, this may not be the case, depending on
the exact specification of the underlying models. There are some more complex fusion
models that ensure that this inference product holds (Pradalier et al., 2003).
It is also interesting to note that, when all the probability distributions in the
product are Gaussian, the resulting probability distribution is also Gaussian. Its mean
is a weighted sum of the means of each Gaussian weighted according to a function
of their variance. Therefore, many weighted models proposed in the literature can
be interpreted as Bayesian fusion models with Gaussian uncertainty. The weights also
acquire the meaning of representing uncertainty, which can sometimes be manipulated.
Finally, a conflict can only occur when it is assumed that a unique object is to
be perceived. When the discrepancy is too large, segmentation occurs leading to the
perception of separate objects (e.g., perception of transparency). Likewise, fusion is
a process of combining information from different sources for one object or feature.
Therefore, to account for segmentation, there is a need for more complex models. Such
models can deal with either one or multiple objects, as well as provide a mechanism for
deciding whether there is one or more objects. This theoretical issue is called binding,
unity assumption, or pairing (Sato et al., 2007), and has received recent attention using
hierarchical Bayesian models.
4 Modularity, hierarchies
It would be difficult to assume that natural cognitive systems process their complex
sensory inputs in a single layer of computation. Therefore, computations can probably
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be apprehended as processes that communicate intermediate results. This is similar
to the notion of modularity, which is central to structured computer programming. A
flow of computation can be broken down into structured sequences. First, we present
Bayesian models that amount to probabilistic versions of subroutine calls and condi-
tional switches. More complex constructs occur when parts of the computations are
based on observing other computation processes. By so doing, we also describe Bayesian
model recognition and Bayesian model abstraction.
4.1 Subroutine
Description Hierarchies rely on the notion of modularity, the simplest instance of which
is the subroutine; that is, the use of part of a model (submodel) within another model.
A model can be seen as a resource that can be exploited by other models.
Example For example, Laskey and Mahoney (1997) propose the network fragments
framework, inspired by object-oriented software analysis and design to define submod-
ules of a global probabilistic model. They apply this tool to military situation assess-
ment, where a military analyst has to reason on various levels (basic units, regiment,
overall situation, etc.)
Koller and Pfeffer (1997) also propose object-oriented Bayesian networks as a mod-
eling language for Bayesian models based on an object-oriented framework.
Model Here, we define the operation of calling a subroutine in terms of the Bayesian
programming framework. Let A and B be variables of interest for the global model. We
add an additional variable, Π, to represent the possible models. Let pi1 be a value of
Π that represents the particular model to be written. When defining pi1, the model Π
is known; that is, the probability distributions are written given Π = pi1. For example:
P (A B | [Π = pi1]) = P (A | [Π = pi1])P (B | A [Π = pi1]).
A call to a subroutine can be performed simply by specifying that a distribution for
this model is the same as that for another model:
P (B | A [Π = pi1]) = P (B | A [Π = pi2]) (14)
where pi2 is another model concerned with variables A and B. Equation 14 is an
assumption that the distribution over B given A in model pi1 is the same as in pi2.
Naturally, this requires model pi2 to be specified. In this submodel, P (B | A [Π =
pi2]) can be a factor in the decomposition of the joint probability distribution over all
the variables of model pi2. In this case, the use of a submodel is not required. However,
most of the time, P (B | A [Π = pi2]) is the result of an inference in model pi2. As a
Bayesian Program, pi2 can be asked any probabilistic question related to its variables
and can be arbitrarily complex. Moreover, many different models can question pi2. In
this sense, pi2 can be considered as a resource.
4.2 Probabilistic conditional switches
Description Mixture models are probability distributions with multiple components.
Such a model is generally a weighted sum of unimodal probability distributions in order
to yield a desired multimodal probability distribution.
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Example Mixture models are basic tools with which to build a model. They are used
as the parametric forms of probability distributions, along with uniform or Gaussian
distributions.
One common use of mixture models is in clustering and classification. A data set is
represented by a mixture of some basis distributions. The aim of clustering is to learn
the parameters of the mixture, whereas classification is usually interested in recovering
the element of the mixture from which a particular observation originates. Classical
examples of mixture models are the Gaussian mixture models.
Mixture of experts is another type of mixture model. Initially, such models were
defined for neural networks (Jacobs et al., 1991). Waterhouse et al. (1996) proposed
a Bayesian learning algorithm for mixture models, the aim of which was to infer the
parameters of the mixture. Bishop and Svense´n (2003) proposed variational methods
of inference for mixture of experts models and applied their algorithm to the prediction
of the position of the end effector of a robotic arm.
Model Mixture models are usually presented directly as weighted sums of distributions:
P (A) =
N∑
i=1
wi × Pi(A) (15)
where N is the number of components, wi is the weight of each component, Pi(A), and∑N
i=1 wi = 1.
Another way to present it involves introducing a variable, Π, which can take integer
values between 1 and N . We can build the following decomposition:
P (A Π) = P (Π)P (A | Π)
where P (A | [Π = pii]) = Pi(A), with Pi(A) as defined above and P ([Π = pii]) = wi.
The probabilistic question corresponding to the mixture model is:
P (A) =
N∑
i=1
P ([Π = pii])P (A | [Π = pii]) =
N∑
i=1
wi × Pi(A).
This definition of a mixture places the emphasis on variable Π, which can be
considered as the index on the component Pi(A) to be chosen. It is hierarchical in the
sense that a collection of models, Pi(A), can be chosen using a variable external to
each of these models.
This mixture model can be generalized by a probabilistic conditional statement.
Let C be the variable representing the test condition. We can build the following joint
probability distribution:
P (A Π C) = P (C)P (Π | C)P (A | Π)
where P (C) is a prior on the condition (not used in the following question), P (Π | C)
is the relative weighting among each of the models that depend on the condition, and
P (A | Π) is a collection, Pi(A), of various models of A, possibly given condition C.
The question can be written as:
P (A | C) =
∑
Π
P (Π | C)P (A | Π). (16)
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With Dirac distributions for P (Π | C), only one model, Pi(A), can be selected in
the expression 16, this question operating like a switch between the models. Otherwise,
this is a probabilistic generalization of a conditional statement; that is, the different
models are weighted according to the condition.
4.3 Model recognition
Description The mixture model allows for a combination of different models into one.
Another issue that can be addressed using Bayesian modeling is model recognition. In
particular, when the class of models is a parameter space and recognition is based on
experimental data, this recognition amounts to a machine learning problem.
Example For example, Gopnik and Schulz (2004) studied the learning of causal depen-
dencies by young children. The experiments included trying to decide which objects are
“blickets” (imaginary objects that are supposed to illuminate a given machine). Some
objects are put on a machine that lights up depending on which objects are placed on
it. The patterns of response were predicted well by a causal Bayesian network, even
after adding some prior knowledge (“blickets are rare”). The learning phase involved
selecting the causal dependency structure that matches the observations among all the
possibilities.
Another example is the application of embedded Hidden Markov Models. These
are models in which a top-level Bayesian model reasons on nodes that are themselves
Bayesian models. Nefian and Hayes (1999) proposed such a formalism in the context
of face recognition. Each submodel is responsible for the recognition of a particular
feature of the face (forehead, eyes, nose, mouth and chin). The global model ensures
perception of the facial structure by recognizing each feature in the correct order. Neal
et al. (2003) applied embedded HMMs to the tracking of 3-D human motion from 2-D
tracker images. The high dimensionality of the problem proved to be less an issue for
their algorithm than it was for the previous approach.
Model These models can be fit using the general framework of Bayesian model recog-
nition. Let ∆ = {∆i} be the variables corresponding to the data used for learning
(∆i, a variable for each datum), and let Π be the variable corresponding to the model.
Generally, model recognition is performed using the following decomposition:
P (Π ∆) = P (Π)P (∆ | Π)
where P (Π) is a prior on the various models and P (∆ | Π) is the probability of
observations given the model (i.e., the likelihood of models).
Typically, the data are assumed to be independently and identically distributed
(the i.i.d. assumption); that is, P (∆ | Π) =
∏N
i=1 P (∆i | Π), where P (∆i | Π) does
not depend on index i of each datum. For each possible model, pij , the distribution,
P (∆i | [Π = pij ]), is a call to the submodel, pij , as defined in section 4.1.
The probabilistic question for model recognition is:
P (Π | ∆) ∝ P (Π)
N∏
i=1
P (∆i | Π). (17)
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The expression 17 enables the computation of a probability distribution on the
various models based on some of the data. This mechanism is hierarchical in the sense
that we build a model for reasoning about an underlying set of models.
Parameters A common instance of model recognition is parameter learning. In this
case, the models, Π, share a common parametric form, Π ′, and the recognition occurs
on the parameters, Θ: Π = Θ∧Π ′. We can modify the decomposition presented above
by including knowledge of the parametric form:
P (Θ ∆ | Π ′) = P (Θ | Π ′)P (∆ | Θ Π ′) = P (Θ | Π ′)
N∏
i=1
P (∆i | Θ Π
′)
where P (Θ | Π ′) is a prior distribution on the parameters and P (∆ | Θ Π ′) (or
P (∆i | Θ Π
′) with the i.i.d. assumption) is the likelihood of parameters.
So, learning can be accomplished using the following question:
P (Θ | ∆ Π ′) ∝ P (Θ | Π ′)P (∆ | Θ Π ′) ∝ P (Θ | Π ′)
N∏
i=1
P (∆i | Θ Π
′).
The likelihood functions are usually completely specified by the parametric form,
Π ′, and the parameters, Θ. However, the prior on the parameters, P (Θ | Π ′), may need
some additional parameters called hyperparameters. The Bayesian formalism allows
for these hyperparameters in the same way. Let Λ be the variable representing these
hyperparameters. We write the joint probability distribution as:
P (Λ Θ ∆ | Π ′) = P (Λ | Π ′)P (Θ | Λ Π ′)P (∆ | Θ Π ′)
where P (Λ | Π ′) is a prior on hyperparameters, P (Θ | Λ Π ′) is the distribution on pa-
rameters, Θ, according to hyperparameters and P (∆ | Θ Π ′) is the likelihood function,
as above. As a result, inference on the parameters is modified slightly:
P (Θ | ∆ Π ′) ∝
∑
Λ
[
P (Λ | Π ′)P (Θ | Λ Π ′)
]
P (∆ | Θ Π ′).
The prior on the hyperparameters could also be parametric, and it is possible to add
another set of parameters. It all amounts to what knowledge the modeler wants to
include in the model. Moreover, it can be shown that deep layers of priors have much
less influence on parameter estimation.
Entropy principles All the entropy principles (maximum entropy principle, minimum
relative entropy principle, Kullback–Leibler divergence) and their numerous applica-
tions are closely and simply related to the above models.
Indeed, to take the simplest case of equation 17, if we consider that there are K
different possible observations (i.e., the variable ∆i can take K different values), by
gathering the same observations, we can restate this equation as:
P (Π | ∆) ∝ P (Π)
K∏
k=1
P ([∆i = k] | Π)
nk
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where nk is the number of times that the observation, [∆i = k], has been made. To a
first approximation, this number is proportional to the probability, P ([∆i = k] | Π),
itself and we obtain, with N is still the total number of observations:
P (Π | ∆) ∝ P (Π)
K∏
k=1
P ([∆i = k] | Π)
NP ([∆i=k] | Π) (18)
Finally, if we assume a uniform prior on the different models, and if we take the
logarithm of equation 18, we obtain the Maximum Entropy Principle:
log (P (Π | ∆)) = N
K∑
k=1
[P ([∆i = k] | Π) log (P ([∆i = k] | Π))] + C.
4.4 Abstraction
Description Usually, a modeler uses learning in order to select a unique model or set of
parameter values, which is then applied to the problem at hand. That is, the learning
process computes a probability distribution over models (or their parameters) to be
applied, and a decision, based on this probability distribution, is used to select only
one model or parameter set.
Another way to use model recognition is to include it as part of a higher-level
program in order to maintain the uncertainty on the models at the time of their appli-
cation. This is called model abstraction.
Example Diard and Bessie`re (2008) used abstraction for robot localization. They de-
fined several Bayesian maps corresponding to various locations in the environment.
Each map is a model of sensorimotor interactions with a part of the environment.
Then, they built an abstracted map based on these models. In this new map, the lo-
cation of the robot is defined in terms of the submap that best fits the observations
obtained from the robot’s sensors. The aim of their abstracted map was to navigate in
the environment. Therefore, they were more interested in the action to be taken than
in the actual location. However, the choice of an action was made with respect to the
uncertainty of the location.
A similar model was also recently applied to the domain of multimodal perception,
under the name of causal inference (Ko¨rding et al., 2007; Sato et al., 2007). When
sensory cues are close, they could originate from a single source, and the small spatial
discrepancies could be explained away by noise; on the other hand, when cues are
largely separated, they more probably originate from distinct sources, instead, and
their spatial positions are not correlated. The optimal strategy, when estimating the
positions of these cues is then to have both alternative models coexist and to integrate
over the number of sources during the final estimation.
Model Let Π be the variable representing the submodels, let ∆ be the variable rep-
resenting the data and let X be the sought-after variable that depends on the model.
The joint probability distribution can be decomposed in the following way:
P (X ∆ Π) = P (Π)P (∆ | Π)P (X | Π)
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where P (Π) and P (∆ | Π) are the priors and likelihood functions defined as before
and P (X | Π) describes the influence of the model, Π, on the variable of interest, X.
The question is concerned with the distribution over X given the data, ∆:
P (X | ∆) =
∑
Π
P (Π | ∆)P (X | Π) ∝
∑
Π
[P (Π)P (∆ | Π)P (X | Π)] .
This inference is similar to model recognition except for the factor P (X | Π). With
respect to the question, P (X | ∆), the details of the models can be abstracted.
When applied to classes of models and their parameters (i.e. when X is Θ), this
abstraction model yields the Bayesian Model Selection method (BMS). It can also
be used to jointly compute the distribution over joint models and parameters, using
P (Π Θ | ∆) (Kemp and Tenenbaum, 2008).
4.5 Discussion
Hierarchy is a means of controlling a given set of models by a higher-level model. This
model uses each lower-level model as a subroutine providing probabilistic relations as
a resource. One common example is behaviour choice. Several models propose some
type of behaviour depending on the partial knowledge that they need, a higher-level
model playing the role of an arbiter between them. There are two common strategies
considered for the arbiter, weighing and switching.
Weighing consists of mixing the various behaviours, usually by summation accord-
ing to some measure. In a Bayesian framework, this is exactly what is achieved by
mixture models (see section 4.2 and in particular equation 15), in which each individ-
ual model contributes to the result of the inference in proportion to its probability. If
the process evolves with time, the probability distribution over the various behaviours
can also evolve and, for example, allow for a smooth transition between behaviours.
On the other hand, switching consists of choosing a behaviour, discarding the oth-
ers, and then applying that behaviour (Stocker and Simoncelli, 2008). This can be seen
as the approximation of the summation in equation 15 by only one term. In this case,
the decision, which is also called an intermediate decision in the model, helps reduce
the complexity of the model by computing only one term instead of all the subroutine
calls in the submodels. Conversely, this is no longer an approximation if the weights
are zero for all except one submodel (a Dirac probability distribution). In this case, a
mixture model is a switching process.
Therefore, the Bayesian formulation unifies these two strategies into a common
hierarchical inference mechanism. Furthermore, the difference between weighing and
switching depends on the probability distribution over the models, switching if it is a
Dirac function (no uncertainty) and weighing otherwise. Therefore, for low uncertainty,
weighing and switching strategies cannot be distinguished.
5 Loops
It would be hard to assume that natural cognitive systems process their complex sen-
sory systems in a single direction, uniquely from sensory input toward motor outputs.
Indeed, neurophysiology highlights a variety of ways that neural system activity can
be fed back in loops. Models that include loops are mainly temporal in nature and deal
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with memory systems. Examples are mostly taken from models of artificial systems,
and especially from the robotics community.
5.1 Temporal series of observations
Description In order to model the temporal behaviour of a phenomenon, it is usually
assumed that a sequential series of observations is available. These are usually used for
state estimation: recovering the evolution of some internal state that is not observed.
Example Kalman filters are the most common examples of models in this category,
probably because of strong assumptions that lead to a closed-form solution for state
estimation (Kalman, 1960; Ghahramani et al., 1997). They are widely used in robotics
(Thrun et al., 2005) and in the life sciences (van der Kooij et al., 1999; Kiemel et al.,
2002). When the state space can be assumed to be discrete, Hidden Markov Models
can be applied (Rabiner, 1989; Rabiner and Juang, 1993). A common technique for
approximating the inference required for state estimation is to model the state prob-
ability distribution using particle filters; this can also be seen as the application of
a mixture model to a loop model (Arulampalam et al., 2002). More generally, these
models are instances of Bayesian filters (Leonard et al., 1992; Bessie`re et al., 2003).
When the independence assumptions do not vary over time, this class of models is
called Dynamic Bayesian Networks (Dean and Kanazawa, 1989; Murphy, 2002). These
models have also been extensively covered in the statistics literature, sometimes using
different vocabularies (Harvey, 1992; Brockwell and Davis, 2000).
Model Let O0:T denote a time series of observation variables from time 0 to T , i.e.,
O0:T = O0, O1, . . . , OT . Let S0:T represent the state variables over the same time
period. The global probabilistic model is defined by:
P (S0:T O0:T ) = P (S0 O0)
T∏
t=1
P (St St−1 Ot) (19)
P (S0:T O0:T ) = P (S0 O0)
T∏
t=1
P (St | St−1)P (Ot | St). (20)
Here, equation 19 results from the application of the Markov assumption: a given
state only depends on a number, n, of previous states, and not on those that occur
previously in the state history. In this case, n = 1 implies a first-order Markov model.
In other words, St−1 is assumed to be sufficient memory for the system. Equation 20
states further that, for all t, the dependency structure between variables is the same.
This is the stationarity hypothesis.
In equation 20, P (St | St−1) is usually called the transition or dynamic model, and
P (Ot | St) is the observation model. When these models have the same form for all
time steps, t, the local model, P (St St−1 Ot) = P (St | St−1)P (Ot | St)P (St−1), is
said to be time invariant or homogeneous. In this case, the model can be seen to be
an application of the subroutine construct; that is, the global model, which deals with
the complete time sequence, is a result of the iteration of the local model.
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State estimation, which corresponds to the question, P (ST | O0:T ), is solved by:
P (ST | O0:T ) ∝
∑
ST−1
P (ST | ST−1)P (ST−1 | O0:T−1).
By so doing, state estimation at time T , P (ST | O0:T ), is computed recursively, based
on P (ST−1 | O0:T−1). In most practical implementations of this computation, the
state evaluation is recomputed each time a new observation is acquired using the past
state estimate as well as the prediction and observation models. In other words, state
estimation occurs in a loop over time.
The same model can be used to predict future states (prediction: P (St+k |O0:t), k >
0), or to refine some past estimate given observations that occur later in time (filtering:
P (St−k | O0:t), k > 0). The larger the value of k, the more computationally expensive
these questions become, as the inferences require summations over k − 1 variables.
5.2 Efferent copy
Description Usually, in robotics and control contexts, the state of the observed system
can be not only observed but also acted upon. The previous models are enriched with
control variables as additional inputs for state estimation. “Reading” the values of these
control variables after they have been decided, in order to ameliorate state estimation
or prediction, is one possible reason for there being efferent copies of motor variables
in animal central nervous systems.
Example Input/output HMMs (Bengio and Frasconi, 1995) have been introduced in
the machine learning literature and applied as benchmarks in grammatical inference.
In the robotic localization context, the Markov Localization model is the most common
example of this model category (Thrun et al., 2005).
In the life sciences, Laurens and Droulez (2007, 2008) applied Bayesian state esti-
mation using efferent copies to the modeling of 3-D head orientation in space in humans
and showed that such models could account for a variety of known perceptual illusions.
Model Let S0:T and O0:T , respectively, denote state and observation time series, as
previously, and let A0:T denote the control time series. The control variables are usually
used to refine the dynamic model into P (St | At−1 St−1):
P (S0:T O0:T A0:T ) = P (S0 O0 A0)
T∏
t=1
P (St | At−1 St−1)P (Ot | St)P (At).
5.3 Decision theory
Description The temporal loop models presented so far are usually used for state
estimation, whether this state is a past, current or future one. They can also be used
to compute probability distributions over future actions. For instance, this can allow
the choice of an action or a sequence of actions that are most likely to help progress
toward a given goal. The goal is usually not defined in probabilistic terms but with the
use of a deterministic function that describes those states and actions that are either
beneficial or detrimental. This is called a reward, cost or loss function. The process of
computing future actions based on this function is known as decision theoretic planning.
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Example A number of current models apply decision theory to robotic and control
planning. For instance, when the above Markov Localization model is enriched with a
reward function, it becomes a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (Kaelbling
et al., 1998; Boutilier et al., 1999), which has been widely applied in mobile robotics.
If the internal state is not “hidden”, in the sense that it can be measured directly,
the sensor model, P (Ot | St), is removed from the dependency structure; the resulting
formalism is a Markov Decision Process (Fully Observable Markov Decision Process).
The issue of decision, that is, passing from a probability distribution to a value, is
actually not specific to loop models. For example, Ko¨rding and Wolpert (2004b) apply
Bayesian modeling to infer what loss function might be used by the central nervous
system in an open-loop motor control problem.
Model The reward function, R, in its most general notation, associates states and
actions with a number that quantifies their interest or cost, R : St ×At → IR.
The reward function helps drive the planning process. Indeed, the aim of this
process is to find an optimal plan in the sense that it maximizes a certain measure
based on the reward function. This measure is most frequently the expected discounted
cumulative reward, 〈
∑∞
t=0 γ
tRt〉, where γ is a discount factor (less than 1), Rt is
the reward obtained at time t and 〈·〉 is the mathematical expectation3. Given this
measure, the goal of the planning process is to find an optimal mapping from probability
distributions over states to actions (a policy).
This planning process, which leads to intractable computations, is sometimes ap-
proximated by iterative algorithms called policy iteration or value iteration. These
algorithms start with random policies and improve them at each step until some nu-
merical convergence criterion is met. Another approach is to try to automatically find
a hierarchical decomposition of the state space, so as to alleviate the combinatorial
explosion (Hauskrecht et al., 1998; Pineau and Thrun, 2002).
5.4 Action selection
Description Instead of trying to find a structural decomposition of the state space
automatically, alternative approaches can be pursued in order to reduce the computa-
tional complexity of the planning and control processes. It is assumed that the model
already incorporates knowledge about the task or domain.
For instance, modeling cognitive systems requires including in the model knowledge
about the environment structure or task progression structure, so as to separate ele-
mentary filters, and to reduce the complexity and dimensionality of the internal state
space. Attention systems must also be defined so that computations are performed only
in those subsets of the state space that are thought to be relevant. Finally, elementary
motor tasks can be identified and modeled as behaviours, so that they are not planned
completely through each time period.
Example Koike (2005); Koike et al. (2008) applied this approach in the domain of
autonomous mobile sensorimotor systems. Koike showed how time and space limits
on computations, and limited on-board processing power, could be accommodated,
3 Please note that, although the notation is the same, γt refers to γ elevated to the power
of t, while Rt refers to R at time index t.
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Fig. 2 Joint probability factorization for the full model as designed by Koike.
thanks to simplifying assumptions such as the stationarity of the temporal models,
partial independence between sensory processes, domain-of-interest selection at the
processing stages (attention focusing) and behaviour selection.
Model Incorporating such knowledge into models makes them less generic and more
sophisticated. Figure 2 shows the joint distribution of the full model from Koike.
In Figure 2, pii refers to the i elementary filters, which are assumed to be indepen-
dent (hence all the
∏Ni
i=1 products). P (S
j
i | S
j−1
i A
j−1
i pii) are their dynamic models,
P (Oj | Sj−1i C
j pii) are their sensor models, P (β
j | Bj Sji B
j−1 pii) are their behaviour
models, P (αj | Cj Sji B
j pii) are their attention models, and P (λ
j | Aj Bj Sji A
j−1 pii)
are their motor command models. Finally, P (A0 S0 O0 B0 C0 λ0 β0 α0 | pi) encodes
the initial state of the system. This model is then used to compute the probability
distribution over the next action to be performed, given the past history of observation
and control variables: P (At | O0:T A0:T−1).
5.5 Discussion
There is no clear definition of a loop. In this section, we have only presented the
definition and examples of temporal loops. These loops can be compared to loops in
the field of computer science, occurring when the execution flow gets several times
through the same set of instructions. Such instructions are specified once for all the
executions of the loop, and the global program is its replication through time.
This replication often occurs with fixed time spans. However, in biological systems,
multiple loops may take place simultaneously with different and sometimes varying
time constants. In robotics, many processes are run concurrently with different levels
of priority. There is a need in Bayesian modeling for a proper way of integrating and
synchronizing loops with different time scales. Finally, loops can also be considered
without reference to time. Bayesian filters are a single model that is replicated at each
time step, with an optional temporal dependency on preceding time steps. Models have
also been proposed for spatial replication of models, with dependencies occurring over a
neighbourhood. One interesting difference is that temporal relations between instances
are oriented according to the passage of time, whereas models of spatial loops, such as
the Markov Random Field, rely on a symmetrical relation between neighbours.
6 Conclusion
In this document, we reviewed a number of cognitive issues that both living and arti-
ficial systems have to face. We grouped these issues according to their global nature,
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in terms of ambiguities, fusion, hierarchies and loops. For each issue, we proposed a
template Bayesian model, according to its general specification, which was based on
examples from the literature.
These groups of issues correspond to a presentation of the models in terms of their
increasing complexity. It can be noted that, in the beginning of the paper, the examples
are taken mostly from the life sciences, whereas toward the end, they are taken from
computer science and robotics. This last point is not a choice but mirrors the relative
shortage of more complex models in biology. However, the recent literature shows that
Bayesian methodology is gaining momentum in the life sciences, even if the proposed
models are still simpler than those developed in computer science (Wolpert, 2007).
One important reason for this difference is that, contrary to the situation in robotics,
the models presented in the life sciences should be falsifiable. That is, there must be a
way to decide whether the model is false or not. By so doing, the assumptions underly-
ing the model can be eliminated. In an uncertain environment, this can be difficult. In
the Bayesian formalism, the analogous paradigm is better replaced by a comparison be-
tween models. Various models corresponding to different assumptions are constructed.
Then, their respective probabilities can be assessed relative to observations using the
recognition mechanism. This process yields a probability distribution over the chosen
models, and the final decision for eliminating models is left to the modeler.
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